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 Recent work in Cognitive Science highlights the importance of exemplar-based 
know-how in supporting human expertise.  Influenced by this model, many accounts of 
moral knowledge now stress exemplar-based, non-sentential know-how at the expense of 
the rule-and-principle based accounts favored by Kant, Mill and others.  I shall argue, 
however, that moral thought and reason is an intrinsically complex achievement that 
cannot be understood by reference to either of these roles alone.  Moral cognition -- like 
other forms of ‘advanced’ cognition -- depends on the subtle interplay and interaction 
between multiple factors and forces and especially (or so I argue) between the use of 





Introduction: Rules and Know-how 
 
 How should we conceive the rule of summary, linguistically-formulated rules, 
principles and imperatives in moral thought and reason?  There is a tradition, rooted in 
Kant (1781) and Mill (1884), but extending all the way to Donagan (1997) and beyond, 
that finds in such rules and principles the rational essence of true moral thought and 
hence of genuinely moral choice and action.  The Kantian, for example, identifies moral 
actions with actions predicated upon moral maxims which the individual is able to 
endorse (will) as universal law.  Actions thus grounded display genuine moral worth 
 
 A rather different tradition, rooted in Aristotle, stresses not the endorsement of 
summary moral maxims, but a kind of practical wisdom, gained by rich and sound 
experience and honed by the needs of daily action.  It is this tradition, whose modern 
exponents include Flanagan (1996), that has become most firmly linked to work in 
cognitive science and (especially, and see below) in Artificial Neural Networks.  For in 
the stress on practical wisdom grounded in rich experience of actual exemplars of real 
moral problems, it has seemed that “Aristotle’s perspective and the neural network 
perspective … converge.” (Churchland, P. M., (1996), p. 106). 
 
 These two pictures (the one stressing skilled know-how, the other stressing 
explicit moral rules and reasoning) are typically depicted1 in strong mutual opposition.  
Churchland, for example, goes on to comment that: 
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This portrait of moral person as one who has acquired a 
certain family of perceptual and behavioral skills contrasts 
sharply with the more traditional accounts that pictured a 
moral person as one who has agreed to follow a certain set 
of rules. 
 P.M. Churchland, 1996, p. 106. 
 
 I shall argue that such bald opposition is a mistake: a distortion of the complex 
nature of moral reason that obscures the real source of human moral expertise.  For 
human moral expertise, I shall argue, is made possible only by the potent 
complementarity between two distinct types of cognitive resource (or “mind-tool” – 
Dennett (1996, Ch. 5)).  One is, indeed, the broadly pattern-based, associative learning 
capacity that we share with other animals and artificial neural networks.  But the other is, 
precisely, the very special modes of learning, collaboration and reason made available by 
the tools of words and discourse.  A mature science of the embodied mind will, I suspect, 
have as its very center a sensitive account of how advanced thought and reason emerges 
from the complex and repeated interactions between these two sets of resources.  
 
2. Moral Expertise 
 
 One driving force behind the cognitive scientific endorsement of the “practical 
wisdom” model of moral knowledge is an influential model of expertise.  It is a model 
grounded in both cognitive psychological studies and in attempts to replicate expert skill 
using artificial neural networks.  With this model of basic biological cognition, I have no 
quarrel - indeed, it is one that I positively endorse (see Clark (1989) (1993)).  What I 
shall be questioning, however, is the concomitant down-playing of the role of actual 
human talk and discourse in exposing and navigating the moral realm: a down-playing 
evident in comments such as: 
4 
 
“Stateable rules are not the basis of one’s moral character.  
They are merely its pale and partial reflection at the 
comparatively impotent level of language.” 
 P. M. Churchland (1996a), p. 107. 
 
“The skill development model we are proposing … 
demotes rational, post-conventional moral activity to the 
status of a regression to a pre-expert stage of moral 
development.” 
 Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1990), p. 252, 256. 
 
 What, then, is the cognitive scientific vision that is meant to lead us to such 
dramatically “anti-sentential” conclusions?  It is, in large part, the demonstration that 
certain kinds of neural network device (of which biological brains are plausibly an 
example) are capable of extracting and encoding information (knowledge) in forms 
whose richness, fluidity and context sensitivity far outstrips anything that could be 
supported by a set of linguistically couched action selection rules, principles or maxims.  
At the heart of the alternative conception is a daunting story about vectors, prototypes, 
high-dimensional state spaces and non-propositional, distributed encodings: a story 
nicely laid out in, for example, McClelland, et al (1989), P.S. Churchland and T. J. 
Sejnowski (1991) and elsewhere.  This computational story dovetails well with cognitive 
psychological work suggesting that much human knowledge is organized around 
encodings of prototypical cases rather than via the use and storage of rules and 
definitions (see Rosch (1973), Smith & Medin (1981)).  For one way to think of the way 
knowledge is encoded in a neural network is to think of the experienced network (the 
network after extended training on example cases of input and desired output) as 
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commanding a rich and context-sensitive battery of prototypes ready to be deployed in 
response to incoming stimuli.   
 
 A prototype, as it emerges in this kind of model, is just the statistical central 
tendency of a set of exemplars each of which displays a range of features.  Typical neural 
network learning algorithms take as input a set of exemplars (or “training instances”) and 
yield a knowledge-base in which the most typical features and the most typically co-
associated feature groups become highlighted and play an especially potent role in 
driving future recall, generalization and problem-solving.  One way to think of the 
extracted prototype is as a point or region in a space which has one dimension for each 
possible feature.  The learnt prototype of a dog may thus subsist in a feature space whose 
dimensions include height, weight, aggressiveness, color and so on.  Exposed to a variety 
of dog exemplars, the connectionist system learns the most common features and 
combinations and hallucinates a “typical dog” – one whose precise feature combinations 
need not correspond to that found in any actually encountered exemplar, but which 
reflects the overall statistics of the training set.  Churchland (1995) notes that a mature 
human brain may command a variety of such prototypes: not just ones for concrete 
objects, but ones for (e.g.) economic, social, moral, political and scientific concepts and 
ideas.  In fact, all human knowledge, according to Churchland, is encoded in this same 
general way.  (for further discussion, see Churchland (1989) (1995), Clark (1989) (1993), 
Fodor & Lepore (1992)). 
 
 The potential importance of all this for our conceptions of moral knowledge and 
moral reason rests on two specific consequences.  The first concerns the grain and nature 
of the knowledge itself.  The second concerns the acquisition of such knowledge and the 
development of moral expertise.  Concerning grain and nature, the now-familiar (see e.g. 
Churchland (1996a), Goldman (1993), Flanagan (1996), Johnson (1993), Clark (1996)) 
point is that our moral knowledge may quite spectacularly outrun anything that could be 
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expressed by simple maxims or moral rules.  For the mode of storage and organization, 
combined with the sheer capacity of biological neural networks, reveals simple sentential 
formulations as, in Churchland’s words, nothing but “a one-dimensional projection of a 
[high] dimensional solid” (1989, p. 18).  The project of reducing the knowledge (know-
how) encoded in a biological neural network to a set of summary moral rules is every bit 
as intractable as that of capturing the knowledge of an expert bridge or chess player in a 
set of such maxims.  Such maxims, as Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1990) suggest, are of great 
value to the novice.  But they cannot replace the finely tuned pattern recognition skills of 
the expert who (we now assume) deploys a highly trained neural network of great 
dimensionality, tuned by exposure to countless instances and minor variations, and 
organized around a multiplicity of stored prototypes representing the fruits of long, hard 
hours of play and practice.  The second important consequence is now also apparent.  The 
development of moral knowledge and expertise is thus crucially dependent on rich and 
varied moral experience.  It cannot be successfully instilled by exposure to simple sets of 
moral maxims, any more than great (or even good) chess play can be achieved without 
dense and repeated practice.  Seen in this light, the provision of ‘moral tales’ and (even 
better) our occasional immersion in rich, often morally complex or ambiguous, novels 
takes on a new importance.  Such “virtual moral experience” affords just the type of 
training that begins to approximate the kinds of rich, real-world experience needed to 
instill genuine moral expertise. 
 
 Churchland (1995), (1996a) also offers a vision of moral debate and moral 
progress firmly grounded in this story concerning supra-sentential individual moral 
know-how.  The account has three important features.  First, it depicts moral knowledge 
as fundamentally similar to non-moral (e.g. scientific) knowledge.  Second, it depicts 
moral debate as a clash between the different prototypes to which a real-world scenario 
might be assimilated.  And third, it depicts moral progress as real (genuinely occurring), 
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but as consisting in something like increasing knowledge of how to match ones behavior 
to the social framework is which one finds oneself. 
 
 The picture, with a little more flesh, is this.  The child finds itself in a complex 
physical and social setting and must acquire a set of perceptual and behavioral skills to 
flourish.  This is not, or not primarily, a matter of learning a set of rules, so much as 
learning how to act and respond in fluent, highly context-sensitive ways.  And it is 
accomplished by the slow, experience-basic training of complex on-board neural 
networks.  The successful learner develops both “skills of recognition” and “skills of 
matching...behavior and the moral circumstances at hand” (Churchland (1996a) p. 105).  
The processes by which we acquire such skills are not, however, specifically moral.  
They are the very same processes involved in all kinds of skill acquisition and the 
knowledge obtained is in no way special.  Scientific knowledge, according to 
Churchland, is ultimately practical knowledge: knowledge of “how to navigate the 
natural world.”  Moral knowledge, likewise, is just knowledge of “how to navigate the 
social world” (op cit p. 106).  Moral and scientific knowledge thus emerge as equally 
‘objective’ – answering to a set of constraints imposed by a reality not itself constructed 
by the individual brain that seeks to comprehend it.  And each domain allows for genuine 
- though pragmatic - kinds of progress in thought and understanding, as we (both as 
individuals and as a species) learn better and better ways to navigate both physical and 
social space.  Moral disagreement, to complete the picture, arises when different agents 
or groups use different prototypes to characterize a situation.  Moral ‘debate’ then 
consists, largely, in the attempt to assert one prototypical understanding (e.g., the fetus as 
person) over another (e.g., the fetus as internal growth).  Churchland says little about how 
such debates are resolved, but presumably any good resolution must ultimately turn on 
the relative usefulness of the prototypes as aids for navigating complex social space. 
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 This concludes my thumbnail sketch of Churchland’s connectionist- inspired 
story about moral thought, argument and progress.  It is a story wonderfully grounded in 
some of the most powerful developments in recent cognitive scientific thought.  But it is 
a story marred, I believe, by a failure to engage with a crucial dimension of human 
thought and reason in general: a dimension, moreover, whose role in enabling moral 
thought is especially critical.  The missing element, to repeat, is a better appreciation of 
the complementary role of moral language and practices of moral debate in both the 





3. Talk and Thought 
 
 The connectionist image of moral thought and reason (in particular) and of 
advanced thought and reason (in general) is incomplete.  It fails to do justice to the 
profound effects of various species of “external scaffolding”2 on human cognition.  One 
striking effect of this failure is an impoverished view of the role of public language and 
public discourse in moral reason. 
 
 It is all too easy, I have claimed (Clark (1996)) to allow the stress on supra-
sentential moral know-how to blind us to the profound importance of linguistic exchange 
and moral maxims.  Even if is true that individual moral understanding typically far 
surpasses anything that a few words can capture, it is also true that moral reasoning and 
decision-making is quintessentially a communal and collaborative affair.  It involves the 
attempt, in a large class of morally crucial cases, to communally negotiate a course of 
action that meets the differing constraints of multiple individuals and interest groups: 
identifying these constraints and displaying a course of action as fair and reasonable is at 
9 
the heart and soul of much contemporary moral thought and reason (think, for example, 
of the debates concerning the social acceptability of euthanasia, or the delicate balancing 
acts involved in setting legal constraints on internet activity).  Yet this process -- of 
negotiating a practical course of action that meets the needs of multiple different groups 
and individuals -- is linguistically-mediated through and through.  It begins with the 
attempt to articulate, often in quite summary ways, the leading ideas, needs and desires of 
various parties, and proceeds via the repeated exchange of linguaform formulations until 
some vaguely acceptable compromise is reached.  Such a process, as long as it is guided 
not simply by local expediency, but also with an eye to more global moral issues, 
underpins all our attempts to discover fair, communally acceptable, co-operatively 
developed solutions to moral, social and political problems. 
 
 In Clark (1996) I argue, in much more detail, that the marginalization of summary 
linguistic formulations and sentential reason found in Churchland (1989) (1995) (1996a) 
and in Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1996) is a mistake.  Summary linguistic formulations are 
not, as e.g. Dreyfus and Dreyfus claim, mere tools for the novice.  Rather, they are 
essential parts of the socially extended cognitive mechanisms which support communal 
reasoning and collaborative problem solving, and are thus crucial and (as far as we know) 
irreplaceable elements of genuinely moral reason.  They are the tools that enable the co-
operative explorations moral space: a space which is intrinsically multi-personal and 
whose topology is defined largely by the different – but interacting – needs and desires of 
multiple agents and groups. 
 
 But language, I now want to suggest, may play an even more fundamental role in 
the development of moral knowledge and the exercise of moral reason: a role associated 
not simply with the communal search for better moral understanding, but with the very 




 There is a substantial case to be made that abstract, ‘higher-level’ thought of all 
stripes is possible – for biological brains whose basic computational profile is much as 
Churchland suggests – only in virtue of a kind of cognitive augmentation rooted in the 
use of signs, labels and words.  In much this vein, Dennett (1996) speaks of the role of 
multiple mind-tools in enabling human cognitive success, while Clark (1997a, 1997b) 
stresses the complementary cognitive benefits of stable, linguistic tokens and fluid 
pattern-associating styles of individual processing.  There are two distinct (but deeply 
related) dimensions to such benefits, and it is worth treating each in turn. 
 
 The first dimension concerns learning and the initial “bringing into focus” of the 
moral domain.  Concerning learning in general, it can be shown (Clark and Thorton 
(1997)) that all known learning algorithms -- both connectionist and classicist -- flounder 
in the face of a certain kind of complexity in the training data.  Very roughly (see the 
previously reference for a lot more detail) such algorithms (assuming they are essentially 
unbiased i.e. not provided with antecedent domain-specific knowledge) are likely to 
uncover only relatively superficial statistical regularities in the input data.  To help 
uncover deeper (“hidden,” relational, and higher-order) regularities, a powerful strategy 
is to re-code the input data so that complex, “hidden” regularities show up as simple 
surface regularities.  For example, if you re-code two poker hands (9, 10, J, Q, K and 10, 
J, Q, K, A) as “straight” and “straight” the deeper relational commonality between the 
two sequences of cards emerges as a simple surface commonality in the labels.  The bulk 
of the work, in such cases, is done not by the basic learning device but by the re-coding, 
however that is achieved. 
 
 Now suppose we view public language, with its convenient stock of moral terms 
and labels as -- from the point of view of individual reason -- a kind of “found” reservoir 
of potentially useful re-codings: re-ifications of complex patterns and tendencies in the 
11 
underlying web of events.  Such items, societally accrued by the painful, slow processes 
of extended search, trial and error over cultural time, will serve to reduce complex, 
otherwise “cognitively invisible” patterns to tractable, learnable regularities and will 
enable individual brains to pursue a deeper and more penetrating exploration of moral 
space.  Such exploration is possible, for basic biological intelligences like ours, only in 
virtue of the repeated transformations of understanding achieved by the use of the 
linguistic signs and labels.  When we learn about promises, duties, rights, obligations and 
so on, we are not just learning labels for moral relevant states of affairs.  We are learning 
to see the world through a new lens –one in which ever deeper patterns (of interactions 
and conflicts among entities such as rights and duties etc.) are revealed as potential 
objects of thought and reason.  Language, on this account, is the special tool which brings 
the moral realm into focus for biological, pattern-based engines of reason, by displaying 
a “virtual reality” in which morally salient patterns and descriptions are the concrete 
objects of subsequent thought and reason. 
 
 Lest this all seem too speculative, abstract and unanchored in concrete cognitive 
scientific research, it is worth pausing to consider a simple-but I think striking-
demonstration.  In recent work with chimps (pan troglodytes), Thompson, et. al. (in 
press) show that the provision of simple arbitrary tokens as “names” for relationships 
allows the chimps to discern complex higher-order relationships which are otherwise 
invisible to the basic (non token-augmented) chimp brain.  Chimps trained to associate 
the relation of sameness (two shoes, two cups, etc.) with one arbitrary tag (a plastic 
token), and the relation of difference (e.g. a shoe and a cup) with a different arbitrary tag, 
prove capable of learning to spot the presence of higher-order relations.  Of a display 
containing two cups and two shoes, they can then judge that the same relation is 
displayed (sameness in each case).  Ditto for a display containing two pairs of unmatched 
items (cup/shoe, ball/banana) – here the same relation is again displayed, although it is 
the relation of difference.  Given one pair of matched and one of unmatched items, the 
12 
higher-order relation is correctly judged to be difference: one pair displays sameness, the 
other difference, hence the higher-order relation is difference.  Chimps lacking the 
history of token training cannot learn to solve these higher-order problems.  A 
compelling conjecture is that the higher-order task becomes tractable because each 
visually presented pair recalls an image or representation of the appropriate plastic token, 
thus reducing the higher-order task to a lower-order one (are the two mentally recalled 
tokens the same or different?).  The image is thus of a potent cascade in which culturally 
acquired tags and labels make available a new quasi-perceptual space in which 
biologically basic capacities of pattern-recognition can be used to negotiate new and 
otherwise cognitively invisible realms. 
 
 Notice, then, that even the process of moral development (learning to see the 
moral domain itself) involves a complex interaction between linguistic tokens and 
signposts and our fine-grained (perhaps ultimately prototype based) appreciation of the 
situations in which they apply, and of the kinds of actions that may or may not be 
appropriate.  For it is our exposure to moral labels (labeling acts as kind, greedy, selfless, 
misguided and so on) that enables our pattern-sensitive brains to isolate morally salient 
patterns which might otherwise remain buried beneath the noise of more superficial 
similarities and dissimilarities.  When Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1990) depict linguaform 
slogans (“don’t tell lies,” etc.) as mere tools for the novice, they have in mind a less 
potent role: the role of enabling roughly acceptable response while we are busy 
developing (vie repeated experience) more precisely honed skills.  The developmental 
image presented above accords moral talk and maxims a more fundamental role: they 
actually make possible the kinds of pattern-and-experience based learning that Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus celebrate, at least in those cases in which the target patterns are abstruse and 
easily swamped by other surface regularities.   
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 There is, of course, a second dimension to this kind of (broadly) language-based 
cognition enhancement.  For the line between learning and mature reason is not hard and 
fast, and the cognitive benefits of linguistic encoding are by no means restricted to the 
processes by which we come to learn about complex moral reality.  Indeed, the picture of 
linguistic tokens as the stable anchor points around which to organize ever-more-abstract 
forms of (in this case) moral perception and reason applies equally well to the case of 
mature thought.  A version of this claim is ably defended by Jackendoff (1996), who 
suggests a number of (what he terms) “indirect” effects of language on thought.  The idea 
is that language makes thoughts and complex trains of thought and argument into objects 
available for attention and inspection in their own right.  The linguistic formulations help 
stabilize complex ideas in working memory and help keep separate the various elements 
of complex thought and arguments, allowing further scrutiny and repeated re-visiting 
from different argumentative perspectives.  In this vein, Jackendoff op cit asserts that 
“language is the only modality that can present to consciousness abstract parts of thought 
like kinship relations, reasons, hypothetical situations and the notion of inference.”  
 
 Moral maxims and recipes are thus the anchor points for moral thought and 
reason.  They are the re-visitable islands of order which allow us to engage in exploratory 
moral discourse, approaching practical moral problems from a variety of angles while 
striving, nonetheless, to maintain a sense of our targets, priorities and agreed-upon 
intermediate positions.  While Churchland and others are surely correct to insist that the 
maxims themselves cannot do justice to the depth and sensitivity of our moral 
understanding, they are wrong to depict them as shallow reflections of our real 
understanding.  Instead, they are tools for focusing, holding steady, and refining moral 
understanding.  And without them, our explorations of moral space, if possible at all, 
would be shallow indeed. 
 
14 
 But why should public language be so well fitted to play the role Jackendoff 
describes?  The answer, I think, turns directly on the two roles for linguistic tokens 
scouted earlier.  The first role was as a medium of collaborative effort, and to that end 
public language is already well-shaped as a tool for interrogation, criticism and the 
pursuit of reasons.  The second role was as a source of new stable entities standing-in for 
complex patterns and relations.  The potency of linguistic formulations as anchor points 
for mature thought and reason flows directly from these more basic attributes.  Public 
language is the favored means by which pattern-completing biological brains bootstrap 
their way into the realm of cascading abstraction, detailed self-criticism, and the 
reflective pursuit of arguments and reasons: clear pre-requisites, surely for any advanced 
form of moral sensibility. 
 
 A partial parallel may exist in the human capacity for mathematical thought.  One 
suggestion recently supported by an impressive array of cognitive psychological and 
neuroscientific evidence (see Dehaene (1996), Dehaene et. al. (1999)) is that the 
distinctive human ability to do arithmetic depends on the coordinated interaction of two 
quite distinct kinds of “mind-tools.’  The first is an innate biological competence at low-
grade approximate arithmetic: a simple number sense shared with pre-linguistic infants 
and other animals, to detect a few absolute quantities (one, two, three) and to appreciate 
changes in quantity and relative quantities (more, less).  The second is a culturally 
acquired and numerical-symbol mediated capacity to describe other exact quantities (22, 
103, etc.) despite the lack of any biologically basic capacity to distinguish e.g. thoughts 
about “53-ness” from thoughts about “52-ness” etc.  Genuine arithmetical understanding 
Dehaene argues, is possible (for brains like ours) only courtesy of the complex interplay 
between culturally constructed (and initially external) symbolic systems and the rougher 
innate sense of simple numerosity. 
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 It is not my purpose to critically discuss this suggestion here (but see Clark (to 
appear)), but merely to display the form of the conjecture.  For it once again suggests 
ways in which basic biological brains may rely on the complementary resources of public 
symbols and codes to successfully penetrate and navigate otherwise intractable regions of 
intellectual space.   
 
 The larger picture which is emerging is thus one in which neither of the original 
poles (the Kantian emphasis on explicitly endorsed moral principles or the Aristotelian 
stress on practical wisdom) captures the subtlety, power and complexity of human moral 
intelligence.  Instead it is the cognitive symbiosis between basic, prototype-style, pattern-
based understanding and the stable surgical instruments (for learning, criticism and 
evaluation) of moral talk and discourse that conjures real moral understanding.  A 
mistake to be avoided, in displaying this complex interplay, is that of depicting linguistic 
formulations as merely low-grade approximations to the finer-grained moral sensibilities 
realized in on-board neural networks: the mistake of in seeing the linguistic ideas as pale, 
partial and somewhat impotent reflections (recall Churchland 1996a p. 107) of real moral 
understanding.  To do so is like suggesting that the rake and the plough are merely pale, 
partial and somewhat impotent reflections of our real ability to farm.  Better by far to see 
the rake and plough as special tools which effectively transform the space in which the 
farmer’s native skills of physical action are deployed and which allow her to tame and 
exploit terrain which would rapidly repel any unaugmented advances.  The image to 
abandon is the image of simple translation: linguistic items do not benefit us solely in 
virtue of their problematic translation into some finer-grained inner code.  Instead, they 
act by complementing, and being brought into co-ordination with, the kinds of prototype-
based knowledge celebrated by Churchland, Dreyfus and others.   
 
4. Situated Moral Epistemology 
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 A situated moral epistemology, as I am using the term, will offer an account of 
moral knowledge and moral reason which is sensitive to the critical roles of a variety of 
non-individualistic elements.  Such elements include the social role of language in 
collaborative problem-solving (Clark 1996), the scaffolding effects of larger scale 
institutional and organizational contexts (for an ‘economic reason’ based foray, see Clark 
(1997a)), and (see above) the cognitive and developmental benefits conferred by the 
framework of moral discourse and moral labels through which our neural engines of 
reason confront the world. 
 
Among the consequences of any shift towards a more situated moral 
epistemology are, first, a somewhat different perspective on the issues concerning moral 
progress and the possibility of genuine moral knowledge, and second, a concomitant shift 
in our ideas about the natural systems in which moral thought and reason inhere. 
 
 Concerning moral progress and the possibility of genuine moral knowledge, it is 
again useful to compare the situated approach with Churchland’s more ruggedly 
individualistic stance.  For where Churchland stresses the potential for steady moral 
progress and convergence, a more situated story suggests historical path-dependence and 
multiple divergent explorations of an exponentially large space of moral possibilities.  
Churchland’s position, recall, is that moral knowledge is fundamentally like scientific 
knowledge.  Both are best seen as bodies of know-how, represented (connectionist-
fashion) in the head, and subject to the same kinds of selective pressure: pressure to 
successfully engage the natural world, on the one hand, and the social world, on the 
other.  Churchland thus emphasizes: 
 
The practical and pragmatic nature of both scientific and 
broadly normative knowledge [and] the fact that both 
embody different forms of know-how: how to navigate the 
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natural world is the former case, and how to navigate the 
social world, in the latter. 
 P. M. Churchland 1995 p. 292 
 
Flanagan (1998) is critical of this parallel, detecting in Churchland as kind of 
“naïve enlightenment optimism about moral progress and convergence” (op cit p. 35).  
Where Churchland draws a parallel between moral and basic scientific understanding, 
Flanagan suggests instead that the moral realm is less constrained and less likely to 
support strong notions of objectivity, convergence and progress.  Moral knowledge, 
Flanagan plausibly asserts, is intrinsically more local and is better compared to the 
multiplicity of successful strategies characteristic of a complex ecology.  Critique and 
debate is thus always “perspectival,” rooted in the local moral ecology.  And there are 
enough different, but equally successful, ways of living (niches) to undermine any simple 
appeal to a “best way” to negotiate social space. 
 
 Something like Flanagan’s picture can be illuminated, I suggest, by further 
reflection on the role of linguistic labels and other forms of external scaffolding in 
influencing the shape and course of moral thought and reason.  For the ultimate source of 
Churchland’s “blind-spot” is his implicit commitment to an essentially individualistic and 
non-constructivist naturalization program: one in which moral thought and reason is 
depicted as a property of individual biological brains, each seeking only the safe 
navigation of an essentially independent social space. 
 
 By contrast, our explorations of moral space are – on my account – highly 
constrained by the specific linguistic frameworks which both enable and restrict human 
thought and reason.  The provision of labels and tags aids us, as we saw, by creating new 
“virtual worlds” in which to bring to bear basic biological capacities of pattern-based 
reasoning.  But every choice of moral vocabulary is likewise restrictive, rendering other 
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patterns invisible to all but the most breathtaking (“revolutionary”) exercises of 
individual thought.  This would not matter if the shape of the social world really did 
enforce certain practices of labeling and talking, as Churchland seems to suggest.  But 
such a view looks to get the descriptive cart well before the constructive horse.  For 
surely, in at least equal measure, it is our communal practices of talking, labeling and 
categorizing that create the special kinds of social space whose successful navigation 
becomes the ‘goal’ of the child’s brain.  And these communal practices, as Flanagan 
again points out, are dictated by multiple forces and local and historical contingencies.  
As a result, there simply is (in one sense) no such thing as “the social world,” existing 
independently of our moral frameworks and capable forcing those frameworks into 
shape.  There is, I will allow, a useful (though famously elusive) notion of human 
flourishing which affords some partial anchor for our moral sensibilities.  But here too, 
there are simply untold numbers of ways to flourish, and (as Flanagan stresses) social 
niches in which and do so.  The overall result is indeed a kind of naturalized, pragmatic 
pluralism, in which moral knowledge is relative to a niche which is partially, as least, 
constructed by the very apparatus (of moral talk, labels and categories) with which we 
confront it. 
 
 This idea may be better appreciated by way of an analogy.  Consider for a 
moment the case of “financial knowledge and reason.”  Financial reason, as Arthur 
(1994) nicely points out, involves dealing with an evolved financial ecology that is, in a 
very concrete sense, partially created by our own activities of labeling and exchanging.  
You begin with something relatively basic – the trading of valuable items (‘underlyings’, 
currencies, debts, soybeans, etc.).  But with this structure in place, increasingly complex 
swaps and trades become possible.  We can buy and sell futures, which are contracts to 
deliver an underlying at a fixed later date, or options to buy.  These options and futures 
then themselves constitute new kinds of underlying, that can be traded as valuable items 
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in their own right.  Which in turn opens up the space of options on futures and so on. (For 
the full story, see Arthur (1996)) 
 
 What I hope to draw from this example is a sense of the power of tags and labels 
to at once create and explore complex spaces.  The creation is not unconstrained, nor ex-
nihilo.  But the spaces themselves become available for exploration only courtesy of the 
linguistic practices themselves. 
 Moral thought and reason seems to share at least something of this nature.  A 
recent example is the emergence of whole new domains of moral and legal complexity 
surrounding the use of the internet and cross-boundary trading (see e.g. Johnson (to 
appear)).  Another case, suggested to me by Carl Wellman, concerns the right to refuse 
medical treatments even when necessary to prolong life.  This right has recently been 
labeled (the label being recognized, though not yet approved, in Cruzan vs. Director, 
Missouri Health Department (1990) 4 97 US 261 at 277) the “right to die.”  Should such 
a label become approved, it is easy to see, as Wellman suggests, how it may help 
reconfigure the space of local moral, ethical and legal argument.  For it then invites a 
rights-based argument in favor of physician-assisted suicide.3  In a similar vein, Nancy 
Fraser (1989) traces the way changes in the way we talk about spousal abuse have gone 
hand-in-hand, historically, with changes in the way we evaluate such behavior.4  No 
doubt examples could be multiplied.  The point, however, is just to suggest – once again 
– that the forces that shape our communal explorations of social and moral space are 
highly diverse, and that social practices of talking and labeling are potent tools that 
simultaneously shape moral space, and make it accessible to pattern-based biological 
reason.  Doing justice to this complex dance must be a primary goal of any situated moral 
epistemology. 
 
 All this has clear implications, it seems to me, for the broader business of 
“naturalizing moral thought and reason.”  For such a project cannot hope to succeed – if I 
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am right – without recognizing that moral reason is a function not simply of our 
individual psychological profiles, but of the larger social, cultural, and linguistic systems 
in which they participate: larger systems which display a marked historicity and path-
dependence, and in which change, progress and evolution are determined as much by 
their own intrinsic dynamics as by the actions or choices of the individuals “within” 
them.  In studying and attempting to understand these systems, we should not be tempted 
to reduce their dynamics to the dynamics of individual biological brains, but neither 
should we assume all the interesting work is done by the larger social and organizational 
structures alone.  For the moral machine is genuinely a complex ecology in which there 
has evolved a fit (for better or worse) between individual agents’ practices and 
expectations, and the social, legal and political institutions and structures in which they 
are embedded.  There has been co-evolution between all the elements of this matrix.  
Moral debate influences the development of moral (social, political, legal and 
educational) infrastructure.  But moral thought and reason is itself constantly and 
profoundly affected and transformed by this infrastructure (think of the role played by the 
U.S. Constitution in sculpting contemporary American debates over pornography, gun 
control and so on).  Our pattern-completing brains are thus directed not at some bare, 
noumenal version of “moral space,” nor even at the more mundane space of practical 
social living.  They are directed, so I claim, at the (communally constructed) space of 
local moral infrastructure: a space populated by laws, constitutions, formal and informal 
norms and a persistent host of summary moral maxims, as well as by the less visible, but 
equally constraining, structures of commerce, industry and educational practice.   
 
5. Conclusions: The Cognitive Complementarity of Rules and Know-How 
 
 Moral knowledge, even Churchland admits, must involve a mix between praxis 
and theoria (see Churchland (1996b).  But having conceded this much, he goes on to 
claim that “the brain draws no distinction between them: both kinds of knowledge are 
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embodied in vast configurations of synaptic weights” (op cit p. 305).  I have tried to 
argue for an alternative view: that moral knowledge is made possible by, and consists in, 
a carefully orchestrated interplay between the kinds of rich, nuanced, know-how directly 
embodied in neural states, and the genuinely different cognitive tools provided by moral 
talk and language.  Such tools function not by simple translation into ‘neuralese’, but by 
providing a new and importantly different class of objects on which to target our 
individual modes of understanding.  Moral talk and labels, on this account, transform the 
space of moral reason as thoroughly as the invention of money transformed the space of 
trade and “bargaining reason.”   
 
 Sensitivity to this transformative role reveals a narrow but navigable pathway 
between two superficially competing visions of moral knowledge: the rule-based and the 
know-how/exemplar based approaches to moral cognition.  Between Kant and Mill, on 
the one hand, and Aristotle (and Churchland) on the other, we now dimly perceive a 
middle territory, in which genuine moral knowledge is essentially a function of the 
complementarity between two sets of mind-tools: the tools of rich, context-sensitive 
practical wisdom celebrated by Churchland, and the linguaform tools which allow us to 
deploy those basic biological resources in increasingly abstract, complex and 
collaborative domains.  Human moral reason, thus construed, is structurally akin to 
human mathematical reason, each depending crucially upon the co-ordination of our 
basic biological sensitivities with the new tools of public formalism and linguistic debate. 
 
 There are other conflicts, too, that may be at least partially reconciled by this kind 
of treatment.  These include the debate over the role of large-scale embedding structures 
in explaining human action (Marxist ideas about structural determination vs. Mill’s ideas 
about individual free action, for example)5 and the debate between moral realists and 
relativists.  But such topics I leave for another day.  In closing, I would stress only the 
highly preliminary nature of these remarks and speculations.  Moral thoughts and moral 
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talk do, I believe, form a deeply interanimated whole.  But the specific shape and nature 
of the crucial interactions is not yet clear, nor the ultimate implications of such 
interactivity of our conceptions of moral knowledge and reason.  Getting this picture 
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1 For an exception, see Sterba (1996). 
2 This broad notion of external scaffolding is based on Vygotsky’s (1962/1986) observations about the role 
of linguistic rehearsal in learning, but extends the image to include all the kinds of social, linguistic and 
technological support that transform the problem spaces confronting the naked biological brain.  See Clark 
(1997b) for the full story. 
3 For a useful discussion of the emergence of new legal rights, see Wellman (1999). 
4 Thanks to Joel Anderson for drawing this example to my attention. 
5 For an excellent treatment, see Andrew Sneddon, “Agents and Actions,” Unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Queens University, Canada. 
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